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Expert testimony describing psychological syndromes is offered
in a broad range of civil and criminal litigation. Unfortunately,
syndrome evidence occasionally leads to confusion. Judge Teague
of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in 1990 that "at the
present time there are too many 'syndromes' and no consensus in
the mental health community as to what they actually mean or are
meant to mean."1 Writing in a similar vein, Chief Judge Everett of
the Court of Military Appeals laments, "I have a good deal of
difficulty with the use of 'expert testimony' in the area of profiles
and syndromes because I am not convinced that such testimony is
of much use to the fact finder."2
Confusion regarding psychological syndromes occurs in part
because the legal literature contains little information on the
definition and uses of syndromes in medicine and psychology.
Without a clear appreciation of the role syndromes play in clinical
decision making, judges and attorneys are handicapped in their
ability to evaluate the probative value of psychological syndromes.
This Article seeks to fill this void in the literature by providing an
analytical framework to assess psychological syndromes. The
Article begins by explaining essential terms. This done, the Article
describes two areas of misunderstanding that account for most of
the confusion regarding psychological syndromes. Finally, the
Article offers an approach to determine when psychological
syndromes should be subjected to the special admissibility test for
novel scientific evidence.
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (Teague, J., dissenting).
2. United States v. August, 21 MI. 363, 365 (C.M.A. 1986) (Everett, C.J., concurring).
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I. DEF NNG TERMS
Although the legal literature devotes many pages to
psychological syndromes,3  too little attention focuses on the
meaning of syndromes, and on the role syndromes play in medicine
and psychology.
A. Definition of Syndrome
The term "syndrome" has been used in western medicine since
1541. 4 Syndrome is defined in Dorland's Medical Dictionary as
"[a] set of symptoms which occur together. ' '5 Murphy describes
syndromes in The Logic of Medicine:
It sometimes happens that several manifestations, no one of which is
specific, tend to occur together. Such a concurrence is referred to by the
Greek word "syndrome;" indeed the word "syndrome" is a literal
translation into Greek of the word "concurrence," a running together.
3. See, e.g., Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a "Better Mousetrap, " 32
S. TEX. LJ. 37 (1990); Patricia A. Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review
of Case Law and Psychological Research, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 293 (1992); David McCord,
Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of
Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19 (1987); Regina A.
Schuller & Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the
Literature, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 273 (1992).
4. See T.R. Harrison, Introduction to ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL SYNDROMES at xiii (Robert
H. Durham ed., 1960) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL SYNDROMES]. Harrison states:
The word syndrome has been in recognized use since 1541 when it appeared in Copland's
English translation of Galen. Although the word is of uncertain definitude nosologically
and scholars are not agreed upon a pronunciation, it has become one of the most
universally used and seemingly indispensable medical terms extant.
Id; see also BENIAMIN F. MILER-CLAIR B. KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE,
NURsINo, AND ALLIED HEALTH 1446 (5th ed. 1992) (defining syndrome as "a combination of
symptoms resulting from a single cause or so commonly occurring together as to constitute a distinct
clinical picture").
5. DoRLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1287 (26th ed. 1981).
In addition to defining "syndrome," "disease," and "diagnosis," it is useful to define "sign"
and "symptom." In reaching diagnostic opinions, professionals consider signs as well as symptoms.
A sign is an objective manifestation of disease or disorder observed by the professional on physical
examination, e.g., a bruise. A symptom is the patient's description to the professional of the patient's
subjective perceptions and memories of bodily and mental states, e.g., the patient's statement, "I feel
like I'm going to vomit." Letter from Jan Bays, M.D., Director, Child Abuse Program, Emanuel
Hospital, Portland, Oregon (March 2, 1993) (on file with author).
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... The mere occurrence of two (or more) findings in a patient does
not suffice to constitute a syndrome.... [I]t would be necessary to
establish that they occurred together more often than one would expect
by chance, before there would be anything to comment on.6
"Syndrome" is defined somewhat loosely in medicine and
psychology. The Encyclopedia of Medical Syndromes states that the
"definition of a syndrome is both vague and variable."7 Wulff
writes in Rational Diagnosis and Treatment that "most syndromes
.. .are not well defined... ." Thus, the word "syndrome" is
elastic, and applies in a variety of situations.
Syndrome is not the only descriptor affixed to concurring
symptoms. The term "profile" is occasionally employed to describe
a set of symptoms, characteristics, or behaviors.' The American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders" uses the word "disorder" rather than
syndrome, although the Manual recognizes that "each of the mental
disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or
psychological syndrome or pattern. . . ."" In this Article, the
word "syndrome" is used, keeping in mind that other labels are
sometimes at work.
B. Definition of Disease
It is important to define "disease," and to differentiate diseases
from syndromes. Dorland's Medical Dictionary defines disease as:
6. EDMOND A. MURPHY, THE LoGIc OF MEDICINE 112 (1976) (emphasis added).
7. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL SYNDROMES, supra note 4, at xiii.
8. HENR R. WULFF, RATIONAL DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 105 (1976).
9. See Wyatt v. State, 578 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting defendant's
proposed expert testimony that defendant did not fit profile of pedophile because such an opinion is
not admissible under Florida evidence law); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988);
1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EvIDENcE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 4.50, at 328-32 (1992)
(collecting cases) [hereinafter EVIDENCE N CHILD ABUSE CASES].
10. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987).
11. Id atxxii.
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[A]ny deviation from or interruption of the normal structure of function
of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of the body that
is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose
etiology, pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown. 2
C. Differentiating Diseases From Syndromes
The concepts of disease and syndrome overlap, but are not
synonymous. With diseases, the cause of the malady is usually,
although not always, known. Thus, influenza is produced by a
specific virus, as is polio. With syndromes, by contrast, the cause
of the patient's symptoms is often unknown or poorly understood.
The Encyclopedia of Medical Syndromes describes the difference
between diseases and syndromes:
The terms syndrome and disease are often unwittingly used
interchangeably although they are not synonymous. In general, a
syndrome evokes more interest and is more challenging than a disease
because its relationships are more obscure and its etiology is less
apparent. If, subsequently, a specific etiologic factor does become
manifest, the condition should then be reclassified to a disease. 3
In DeGowin & DeGowin 's Bedside Diagnostic Examination, the
authors expand on the distinction between disease and syndrome:
For several thousand years physicians have recorded their observations
and clinical trials about patients. In the accumulated facts they have
discerned disordered patterns of bodily structure, function, and
mentation. Some patterns of features recur with such frequency as to
suggest a common cause; the disorder with these features is called a
disease and is given a specific name.... Other clusters of attributes,
less closely related to a single cause, but known by a combination of
features, are called syndromes. 4
12. DORLAND's ILLusTRATED MEDIcAL DICTIONARY 385 (26th ed. 1981).
13. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL SYNDROMES, supra note 4, at xiii-ix; see also EDMUND A.
MURPHY, THE LOGIC OF MEDICINE 114 (1976) (explaining that "where there is a rational connection
between manifestations, it is not useful to apply the term 'syndrome'").
14. RICHARD L. DEGOWIN, DEGOWIN & DEcowIN's BEDsIDE DIAONOsTIc EXANINATION I
(5th ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
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Thus, diseases often have a relatively well understood
relationship to a specific cause or etiology. By contrast, the cause
or causes of syndromes are often unknown or obscure.
D. Definition of Diagnosis
"Diagnosis" has more than one meaning. First, diagnosis is a
process.'5 It is the "art of distinguishing one disease from
another."'" Second, diagnosis describes the end-product of the
diagnostic process. Diagnosis is the "name given to a disease that
has been distinguished from others."' 7 Diagnostic terminology is
employed with syndromes as well as diseases.
E. Syndromes and Diseases Share the Feature of Diagnostic Value
Diseases and syndromes share the medically and forensically
important feature of diagnostic value. That is, diseases and
syndromes point with varying degrees of certainty to particular
causes. With many diseases, the relationship between symptoms
and etiology is clear. With syndromes, by contrast, the relationship
is often unclear or unknown. Despite this lower degree of
diagnostic certainty, however, syndromes are suggestive of
particular causes.
The important point about syndromes is that the certainty with
which a syndrome points to a particular cause varies with the
syndrome. Thus, syndromes are on a continuum of certainty. Some
syndromes point with greater certainty to their cause than others.
15. See HEN~m R. WuLFF, RATIONAL DIAGNOSIS AND TREAnTmEr (1976). The author
describes diagnosis as a process and explains:
When the clinician has recorded his patient's iatrotropic symptoms and the usual routine
data, he will consider which diagnosis is the most probable, and if this diagnosis is a
clinical syndrome, he will institute those investigations which are necessary to fill in the
nosographic picture. If the patient does not fulfill the criteria for that syndrome, he will
then institute those investigations which are necessary to make or exclude the diagnosis
of the second most probable syndrome, and so on.
let at 105.
16. DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DIcTIONARY 369 (26th ed. 1981).
17. Id.
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Two syndromes that are used in litigation illustrate the continuum
of certainty: Battered child syndrome and rape trauma syndrome.
THE CONTINUUM OF CERTAINTY
Less Certainty Greater Certainty
Rape Trauma Battered Child
Syndrome Syndrome
A child with battered child syndrome is very likely to have
suffered nonaccidental injury. That is, battered child syndrome
points convincingly to abuse. From a medical point of view,
battered child syndrome has high diagnostic value. From a forensic
point of view, battered child syndrome has high probative value."8
The syndrome points directly to abuse.
Contrast the high probative value of battered child syndrome
with the lower probative value of rape trauma syndrome to prove
that a woman did not consent to sexual intercourse. 9 Rape trauma
syndrome consists of symptoms that are caused by a number of
events including, but not limited to, rape. Rape trauma syndrome
18. Expert testimony on battered child syndrome has been approved by every appellate court
to consider it. For review of cases, see EVIDENCE IN CHI. ABUSE CASES, supra note 9, § 3.5, at
143-47.
19. Recent psychological research indicates that some psychological symptoms may be unique
to rape victims, increasing the probative value of rape trauma syndrome. See Patricia A. Frazier &
Eugene Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law and Psychological Research, 16
LAw & HuM. BElAv. 293 (1992).
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points toward rape, but not as convincingly as battered child
syndrome points toward child abuse.2"
II. Two SOURCES OF MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYNDROMES
Misunderstanding regarding psychological syndromes springs
from two sources. The first source of confusion relates to the
continuum of certainty along which syndromes are arrayed.
Individuals unschooled in syndromes may overlook the continuum,
and succumb to the fallacy that all syndromes point clearly and
convincingly to a particular cause. This error leads to unwarranted
inflation of the probative value of particular syndromes.
The problem of inflated probative value is abetted by the names
of certain syndromes.2' Rape trauma syndrome is a prime
example. The name rape trauma syndrome suggests a strong
relationship between the syndrome and rape. In fact, however,
although rape trauma syndrome provides some evidence of rape,
the probative value of the syndrome is at the low end of the
continuum of certainty. The very name "rape trauma syndrome"
exaggerates the probative value of the syndrome.
The second and, in some respects, more serious source of
confusion regarding psychological syndromes arises from
application of the word "syndrome" to situations that differ
markedly from the meaning of syndromes in medicine and
psychology. Recall that in medicine and psychology, syndromes
typically point with varying degrees of certainty to particular
20. Courts differ on the purpose for which rape trauma syndrome (RTS) is admissible. Several
jurisdictions allow RTS testimony to prove that rape occurred, that is, as substantive evidence of lack
of consent. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 29 MJ. 105 (C.M.A. 1989); State v. Huey, 145 Ariz.
59, 699 P.2d 1290 (1985); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982); State v. McCoy, 179
W. Va. 223,366 S.E.2d 731 (1988). Other courts reject RTS as substantive evidence, but permit RTS
evidence to rehabilitate the victim's credibility following impeachment. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe,
36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo.
1987); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1990); State v. Hall,
330 N.C. 808, 412 S.E.2d 883 (1992).
21. Among the syndromes with names that give a false sense of certainty are false memory
syndrome and parental alienation syndrome. In point of fact, these two syndromes are nondiagnostic
in nature, and provide no insight into the cause of "false" memories or "parental alienation."
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causes. Presence in a patient of symptoms comprising a syndrome
assists the diagnostic process by pointing to the cause of the illness.
Some so-called syndromes depart from this accepted meaning in
that they do not point with any degree of certainty to a particular
cause. The term "nondiagnostic syndrome" will be used to describe
syndromes that fall outside the traditional meaning of syndrome,
and that do not point to a particular cause.
It is useful to describe a nondiagnostic syndrome, and to
contrast it with a syndrome that possesses diagnostic value. One is
hard-pressed to find a nondiagnostic syndrome that has caused
more confusion in legal circles that child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). The term CSAAS was coined
by psychiatrist Roland Summit to describe how children
accommodate to ongoing sexual abuse.22 Children "learn to accept
the situation and to survive. There is no way out, no place to run.
The healthy, normal, emotionally resilient child will learn to
accommodate to the reality of continuing sexual abuse., 23 Summit
described five aspects of the accommodation syndrome: (1)
secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4)
delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction
or recantation.24
CSAAS is a nondiagnostic syndrome because it does not point
with any certainty to sexual abuse. The fact that a child
demonstrates one or more aspects of CSAAS does not assist in
determining whether the child was sexually abused. For example,
the fact that a child delayed reporting and then recanted is hardly
evidence that abuse occurred.' Summit observes that "[t]he
accommodation syndrome is neither an illness nor a diagnosis, and
it can't be used to measure whether or not a child has been
22. See generally Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 177 (1983).
23. Id. at 184.
24. I at 181.
25. See Andrew Cohenr, Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical
Characteristics of SexualAbuse Victims, 74 GEo. LJ. 429, 446 (1985) (stating: "There is something
fundamentally strange about saying that since the child denies that the event occurred, it must have
occurred.").
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sexually abused."26 CSAAS was designed not to prove that abuse
occurred, but to explain children's reactions to sexual abuse.
Contrast CSAAS, which lacks diagnostic value, with battered
child syndrome. Battered child syndrome is a diagnostic syndrome
in the traditional sense of the word. Battered child syndrome points
clearly to physical abuse. With battered child syndrome, one
reasons from the presence of certain injuries to the cause thereof.
Similar reasoning cannot be used with CSAAS because the five
attributes of CSAAS do not point to their cause.27
CSAAS led to confusion in child sexual abuse litigation when
prosecutors mistakenly offered expert testimony on the syndrome
as substantive evidence of abuse. 8  Thus, in Lantrip v.
Commonwealth,29 the prosecutor's expert testified that the child's
"behavior subsequent to the incident fulfills the guidelines of the
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome."3 The Kentucky
26. Mary B. Meinig, Profile of Roland Summit, 1 ViOLENcE UPDATE 6, 6 (May 1991).
27. See generally John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Litigation,
68 NEa. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Expert Testimony]. The authors write:
Unfortunately, a number of mental health professionals, lawyers, and commentators
drew unwarranted comparisons between battered child syndrome and child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome. This error led to considerable confusion. First, some
professionals misinterpreted Summit's article, believing Summit had discovered a
"syndrome" that could diagnose sexual abuse. This mistake is understandable, if not
forgivable. Mental health and legal professionals working in the child abuse area had long
been accustomed to thinking in terms of syndrome evidence to prove physical abuse.
Battered child syndrome was an accepted diagnosis by the time Summit's accommodation
syndrome came along in 1983. It was natural for professionals to transfer their
understanding of battered child syndrome to this new syndrome, and to conclude that the
accommodation syndrome, like battered child syndrome, could be used to detect abuse.
If the frst error was erroneously equating child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome with a diagnostic device, the second mistake was hardly less serious. Some
professionals conflated the reactions described by Summit, which are not probative of
abuse, with behaviors that are probative of abuse. This combination of behaviors was then
denominated a syndrome, the presence of which was supposedly probative of abuse. The
defect of this "syndrome" is that some of its components are probative of abuse and
others are not. Opinions based on such a "syndrome" are of dubious reliability.
let at 67-68 (citations omitted).
28. See, e.g., People v. Payan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1986), reh"g denied and ordered depub'd,
Jan. 30, 1986. Courts have clarified early confusion about the proper role of expert testimony
describing CSAAS. See People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988); State
v. J.Q., 130 NJ. 554, 617 A.2d 1196 (1993).
29. 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986).
30. Id at 817.
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Supreme Court ruled correctly that CSAAS is inadmissible to prove
that abuse occurred.3
Misunderstanding of CSAAS has had unfortunate consequences.
Expert testimony based on CSAAS led some courts to believe the
syndrome was designed to diagnose child sexual abuse. So viewed,
CSAAS was doomed to fail because it simply does not diagnose.
It is not surprising that courts became suspicious of the ability of
mental health professionals to diagnose sexual abuse. Unlike
battered child syndrome, which is highly probative of nonaccidental
injury, the accommodation syndrome appeared anything but
reliable. Courts were not informed that the accommodation
syndrome was being asked to perform a task it could not
accomplish.32
CSAAS has a place in the courtroom, but not as substantive
evidence that abuse occurred. The syndrome is useful to rehabilitate
children's impeached credibility by explaining that behaviors such
as delayed reporting and recantation are not inconsistent with
sexual abuse.33
The common feature of nondiagnostic syndromes is that they
do not point with any certainty to a cause. The cause must be
ascertained by other means. In sum, the purpose of nondiagnostic
syndromes is not to establish causes, but to describe reactions to
known causes.
When evidence of a psychological syndrome is offered, it is
essential to determine whether the syndrome is diagnostic or
nondiagnostic. Differentiating diagnostic from nondiagnostic
syndromes draws on analytical principles familiar to the bench and
bar. Determining whether a syndrome is diagnostic is essentially a
question of logical relevance, that is, does the presence of certain
symptoms have any tendency in reason to make the existence of a
31. The Kentucky Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that CSAAS is not generally
accepted in the scientific community as a reliable way to diagnose clild sexual abuse. Id. at 817. In
a series of decisions subsequent to Lantrip, the Kentucky Supreme Court continues its rejection of
expert testimony based on CSAAS. The Kentucky experience with CSAAS is described in Hellstrom
v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1992).
32. Expert Testimony, supra note 27, at 68.
33. State v. J.Q., 130 NJ. 554, 617 A.2d 1196 (1993); EVIDENcE IN CHILD ABUSE CASES,
supra note 9, § 4.33, at 289.
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particular cause more probable?34 If the answer is yes, the
syndrome is diagnostic. If it is not possible to draw a logical
inference from symptoms to cause, the syndrome is nondiagnostic.
If the syndrome is nondiagnostic, it goes without saying that it
should not be admissible to establish the cause of a patient's
symptoms.
The confusion that so often accompanies expert testimony
describing psychological syndromes abates when judges, attorneys,
and expert witnesses understand the distinction between diagnostic
and nondiagnostic syndromes, and when syndromes are categorized
appropriately. When a diagnostic syndrome is involved, it is
important to evaluate its probative worth in terms of the continuum
of diagnostic certainty.
Ill. PSYCHOLOGICAL SYNDROMES AS NOVEL
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
New psychological syndromes pop up regularly.35 Late entries
include parental alienation syndrome,36  false memory
syndrome,37 lying child syndrome," and confusional arousal
34. FED. R. EviD. 401 (defining relevant evidence to mean "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); CAL. EviD. CODE § 210 (West
1992) (stating relevant evidence means "evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of
a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action").
35. Indeed, so many syndromes emerge that Judge Teague of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals wondered when there will be an "appellate court judge syndrome." Werner v. State, 711
S.W.2d 639, 649 C(ex. Crim. App. 1986) (Teague, J., disrcnting).
36. See generally RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME AND THE
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN FABRICATED AND GENUINE CMIMD SEX ABUSE (1987). For a case
discussing this nondiagnostic syndrome, see Wiederholt v. Fischer, 169 Wis. 2d 524, 485 N.W.2d
442 (1992).
37. An increasing number of adults claim to remember long-forgotten sexual abuse during
childhood. Recovery of such memories often occurs during psychotherapy. The reliability of these
memories is a hotly contested. In March 1992, the "False Memory Syndrome Foundation" was
established to respond to what its founders perceive to be widespread creation of false memories of
abuse.
38. See Jennette v. State, 197 Ga. App. 580,583,398 S.E.2d 734,737 (1990) Here, the court
held that the jury did not need expert assistance to evaluate the children's credibility, Id. The
defendant, a Junior ROTC instructor, was charged with sexually abusing several of his female
students. Id at 582, 398 S.E.2d at 735. At trial, defendant offered expert testimony on the "lying
1459
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syndrome. 9 The reliability of some new psychological syndromes
is seriously in doubt, and expert testimony based on such
syndromes should be subjected to the special admissibility test for
novel scientific evidence."
Jurisdictions apply several tests to novel scientific evidence,
4 1
the most well-known of which derives from the 1923 decision in
Frye v. United States.42 In Frye, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled on the admissibility of
a precursor of the polygraph. The court wrote:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
43
child syndrome" which, according to defendant, would "explain the propensity of a child to relate
and to repeat untruthful statements about a person who is an authority figure in their life in order to
manipulate that child's environment." Id. at 584, 398 S.E.2d at 736. The trial court rejected the expert
testimony, and the court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the proffered testimony "goes to the
credibility and believability of the victim witnesses' testimony that appellant committed the acts
charged." Id at 583, 398 S.E.2d at 737.
39. See generally People v. Cegers, 7 Cal. App. 4th 988, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297 (1992).
40. Courts apply the special admissibility test to novel psychological syndromes. See People
v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236,681 P.2d 291,203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (rape trauma syndrome); People
v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988) (child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome).
Reliability is the key factor in the assessment of novel scientific evidence. People v. Kelly, 17
Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976); EVIENCE IN CHILD ABUSE
CASES, supra note 9, § 4.17, at 257-58.
41. This Article is not the place for a lengthy analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
various tests. For an in-depth analysis, see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); EVIDENCE
IN CHILD ABUSE CASES, supra note 9, §§ 4.14-4.19, at 255-68.
42. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). California courts employ the Frye test. People v. Kelly, 17
Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
In People v. Stall, the California Supreme Court discussed application to psychological evidence
of the rule governing novel scientific evidence. People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1156,783 P.2d 698,
710, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 123 (1989). The court stated "that, given the rule's prophylactic purpose,
nothing precludes its application to 'a new scientific process operating on purely psychological
evidence.' Id In California, the special admissibility test is known as the Kelly-Frye test.
43. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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Under the Frye test, the proponent of novel scientific evidence
must establish that the evidence has gained general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community.' Although Frye remains the
law in many states,45 the test is increasingly criticized because its
conservative nature leads to exclusion of scientific evidence that
could assist the trier of fact.46 An increasing number of courts
reject Frye in favor of a two-stage process known as relevance
analysis.47 With relevance analysis, general acceptance in the
scientific community is no longer the sole criteria governing
admissibility. Courts consider all factors that shed light on the
reliability of the evidence. Once reliability is assessed, the court
44. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 54, 641 P.2d 775,796, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 265 (1982)
('It is the proponent of such testimony, of course, who has the burden of making the necessary
showing of compliance with Frye, i.e., of demonstrating by means of qualified and disinterested
experts that the new technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific
community.").
45. See, e.g., Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991); People v. Stoll, 49 Cal.
3d 1136, 783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989); Giannelli, supra note 41, at 1205 (stating that
" ]he Frye test has dominated the admissibility of scientific evidence for more than halfa century");
1 DAVID W. Louisu.L & CHRISTOPHER B. MUE.LER, FEDERAL EVIDmCE § 105, at 821 (1979)
(stating that "[Trhe Frye approach has been widely adopted by both state and federal courts.").
46. Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429,431 (1991); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 396 (Utah 1989); United States v. Gipson, 24 MJ. 246, 250 (C.M.A. 1987); Linda E. Carter,
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases in California: Retire Kelly-Frye and
Return to a Traditional Analysis, 22 LOYOLA L.A. L. Rnv. 1103, 1142-43 (1989); David McCord,
Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray
into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 29-30
(1986).
In People v. Stoll, the California Supreme Court recognized with apparent approval the
conservative nature of the Kelly-Frye test. People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136,783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 111 (1989). The court wrote:
The courts are willing to forego admission of [novel] techniques completely until
reasonably certain that the pertinent scientific community no longer views them as
experimental or of dubious validity. This all-or-nothing approach was adopted in full
recognition that there would be a 'considerable lag' between scientific advances and their
admission as evidence in a court proceeding.
Id. at 1156, 783 P.2d at 710, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
47. For discussion of relevance analysis, see People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57, 93-94,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436,459-60 (1992); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985);
Carter, supra note 46, at 1147-48; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting of Scientific
Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 557-59
(1983); EVIDENCE IN CHI.D ABUSE CASES, supra note 9, § 4.19; JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 703[03] (1992).
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balances the probative value of the evidence against the likelihood
of unfair prejudice to the opposing party.4"
There is ample reason to subject novel psychological syndromes
to the special admissibility test before exposing jurors to such
potentially powerful evidence.49 First, as with all novel scientific
evidence, it is critical to determine at the outset whether a new
psychological syndrome is sufficiently reliable to warrant any
consideration at trial.
The second reason to apply the special admissibility test is to
determine whether a particular syndrome is diagnostic or
nondiagnostic. If the syndrome is nondiagnostic, it should not be
admissible to prove that a person's symptoms result from a
particular cause. If the syndrome is diagnostic, it is important to
locate the syndrome on the continuum of diagnostic certainty. This
done, the court can balance the probative value of the syndrome
against the possibility of unfair prejudice to the party opposing
admission of the syndrome. The foregoing determinations should
occur outside the presence of the jury, and the evidentiary hearing
required by the special admissibility test is ideally suited to the
task.
The third reason to apply the special admissibility test derives
from the fact that "[1]ay jurors tend to give considerable weight to
'scientific' evidence when presented by 'experts' with impressive
credentials."5  Jurors can be "blindsided 51  by syndrome
evidence, particularly when the syndrome "appears in both name
and description to provide some definitive truth which the expert
need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury.
' 52
48. FED. R. EvID. 403; see EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE CASES, supra note 9, § 4.19, at 267
(describing the factors considered at the second stage).
49. See Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1155-56, 783 P.2d at 710, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 123. Here, the
California Supreme Court wrote that applicability of the test for novel scientific evidence "has often
been determined by reference to its narrow 'common sense' purpose, i.e., to protect the jury from
techniques which, though 'new,' 'novel,' or 'experimental,* convey a 'misleading aura of certainty.'"
Id
50. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,31,549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976).
51. The term is borrowed from the California Supreme Court's decision in Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d
at 1157, 783 P.2d at 710, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
52. Id. at 1156, 783 P.2d at 710, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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A. When is a Psychological Syndrome Novel?
The wrapper is barely off some psychological syndromes, and
their novelty is obvious.53 With other syndromes, assessing
novelty is more complex. One scientific principle remains novel for
years, while another passes from novelty to acceptance overnight.
One thing is clear: Novelty cannot be equated with longevity.
Perhaps the most useful approach is to link novelty with
reliability.54 A scientific principle should be considered novel as
long as substantial questions remain concerning its reliability. With
the emphasis on reliability, the special admissibility test applies
when expert testimony is based on scientific principles of
questionable reliability.55
B. California's Unworkable Distinction Between Expert Opinion
and Scientific Evidence
California courts apply the special admissibility test to novel
scientific evidence, but not to expert opinion.56 Unfortunately, the
53. For example, the term "false memory syndrome" was coined in 1992, and, at this writing
(March 1993), false memory syndrome is novel.
54. See Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1155-56, 783 P.2d at 710, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
55. EVIDENCE IN CLI) ABUSE CASES, supra note 9, § 4.17, at 257-58 (footnote omitted); see
In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987) (California Court of
Appeal measuring novelty in terms of the propensity of jurors to accord too much weight to scientific
evidence and writing that "a scientific procedure, technique or theory should be characterized as a
'new scientific method of proof' ... if factfinders would 'tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree
of certainty' to it.").
56. People v. Cegers, 7 Cal. App. 4th 988, 997, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 303-04 (1992); Stoll,
49 Cal. 3d at 1141, 783 P.2d at 700, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 113; People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351,
366-67,690 P.2d 709,719-20,208 Cal. Rptr. 236,246-47 (1984); see Carter, supra note 46, at 1112
(describing the California Supreme Court's distinction between expert testimony and scientific
evidence). Professor Carter states:
[Tihe court has exempted the "personal opinion" of a psychological expert from the Kelly-
Frye requirements. In People v. McDonald, the court distinguished an expert's personal
opinion from scientific evidence. The court stated that the Kelly-Frye rule did not apply,
for example, to expert medical testimony, including expert psychiatric testimony. The
court reasoned that the purpose of imposing the Kelly-Frye rule did not exist when the
testimony was personal opinion because jurors are naturally more skeptical toward an
expert's verbal opinion than they are toward machine-processed evidence, which exudes
an "aura of infallibility."
I& (footnotes omitted).
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distinction between scientific evidence and expert opinion has not
been made clear, and the dichotomy does little more than confuse
analysis of when the special admissibility test applies. Professor
Linda Carter argues convincingly that "the distinction between
personal opinion and scientific evidence ignores the fact that all
expert opinion is based on some underlying theory or process. To
be consistent, expert testimony must be subjected to [the special
admissibility test] if the principle it is based on is novel.
5 7
California courts would do well to jettison the unworkable
distinction between scientific evidence and expert opinion, and
apply the special admissibility test whenever expert testimony is
based in whole or considerable part on a novel psychological
syndrome.5" Moreover, if the court is persuaded that a new
psychological syndrome underlies expert testimony, the proponent
should not be allowed an end run around the admissibility test with
the ruse of omitting the word "syndrome" from the expert's
testimony.
IV. CONCLUSION
Expert testimony describing psychological syndromes makes a
useful contribution to litigation, but only when fact finders
understand the strengths and weaknesses of such testimony. The
special admissibility test for novel scientific evidence is a useful
gate keeper, turning away syndromes that are not sufficiently
reliable to find their way into evidence. Once reliability is
established, it remains important to differentiate diagnostic from
nondiagnostic syndromes, and to restrict syndromes to roles they
are designed to fulfill.
57. Carter, supra note 46, at 1112-13.
58. See Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1156,783 P.2d at 710,265 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (concluding that the
test "applies to that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part, on a technique,
process or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law-).
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